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The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation:
A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts
Robert B. Ahdieh*
"[Groups] may surpass--collectively and as a body, although not
individually-the quality of the few best ....[W]hen there are many, each
has his share of goodness and practical wisdom .... [S]ome appreciate one
part, some another, and all together appreciate all."l
INTRODUCTION
The promise of efficient contracting stands among the conceptual pillars of
the freedom of contract. Yet for all the scholarly ink spent on that promise, realworld reliance on form contracts and the use of boilerplate terms even in
tailored contracts counsels closer consideration of our vaunted freedom. Even
among the highly specialized-and highly compensated-attorneys charged to
draft sophisticated sovereign bond contracts, the use of boilerplate is all but
universal. Notwithstanding frequently noted inefficiencies-which I outline
below-an array of standardized terms has been replicated in contract after
contract after contract.
After decades of inefficient lock-in, however, the drafting choices of
sovereign debtors are today in the midst of dramatic transformation. Most
significantly, recent years have seen a precipitous shift, from the almost
invariable inclusion of unanimous consent requirements. that all bondholders
approve any restructuring of debt obligations, to the similarly universal use of
less stringent, majorio action provisions for debt restructuring. In early 2003, few
observers would have predicted any shift in the long-standing drafting
convention favoring unanimity. Yet by the end of that year-with no
centralized, regulatory mandate-a strong norm favoring the inclusion of
collective action rather than unanimous action clauses had emerged.
Associate Professor of Law, Emory Law School. JD, Yale University; AB, Princeton University.
My thanks go to Bill Buzbee, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Michael Kang, Marc Miller, Robert
Schapiro, and Brad Setser, for their insights and guidance on earlier drafts of this essay.
Aristotle, The Polifics 108-09 (Oxford 1995) (Ernest Barker, trans).
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Notably, a bewildering array of committees, networks, and other collectives
of sovereign debt market participants-some formal and others less soemerged around the shift from unanimous action clauses ("UACs") to collective
action clauses ("CACs"). At every turn, groups of market participants seemed to
come together to coordinate the pursuit of common ends.2 The abrupt and
unexpected change in sovereign debt contracting conventions to favor CACs
thus offers an opportunity to consider a potential role for the decentralized yet
coordinated action of groups in facilitating norm transformation.
Legal scholars, as well as economists, 3 have focused inadequate attention
on the role of clearly defined groups of market participants-committees, task
forces, and the like-both in social ordering generally and in the adoption and
evolution of norms. One might trace this neglect to some presumptive
orientation to state actors and autonomous individual actors as the sole parties
of interest in social ordering. Yet, alternative stories of social ordering and norm
change might also be told. Such stories, by analogy, are a staple of the dramatic
literature.
One might thus recall the ill-fated families of Romeo and Juliet-a drama
defined by collective, and coordinated, action. In Shakespeare's familiar tale,
well-defined groups struggle internally with their defining norms, while
simultaneously engaging in recurrent interactions with competing groups,
defined by their own, distinct norms. Another illustration might be the jury of
Twelve Angry Men, charged to offer a collective verdict-one ultimately reached
through a slow but inexorable process of internal transformation.
It is to such stories of groups that this brief Essay attempts to call greater
scholarly attention. It does so with reference to the no less dramatic (if
somewhat less poetic) story of the transformation of sovereign debt contracting
norms in recent years.

2

The sovereign debt market participants of interest herein include sovereign issuers; debt
underwriters; issuer and underwriter counsel; buy- and sell-side creditors of varied character;
creditor counsel; official sector institutions such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF'), and
major developed countries.
See Alan S. Blinder and John Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One?: An ExperimentalAnaysis of
Group vs. Individual Decsionmaking 2 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
Series), available online at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909> (visited Mar 29, 2005):
Do decisions made by groups differ systematically from the decisions of the
individuals who comprise them? That is a question infrequently asked by
economists, even though economics is often characterized as the science of
choice. As a profession, we analyze and glorify the virtues of freely-made, selfinterested decisions. But those decisions are almost always individual choices.
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Groups do, of course, make some appearance in the legal literature. The
study of social norms is inherently an analysis of groups.4 Interest group
theories-a staple of legal analysis since the percolation of Mancur Olson's work
among legal scholars'-as well as the analysis of private legal systems6 and the
related literature of private lawmaking7 are likewise about groups.8 With a
handful of exceptions, however, legal scholars have not focused on groups as
concrete, and operational, institutions. 9 Instead, most legal analysis of groups is

5

See, for example, Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J Legal
Studies 377, 386 (1997). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 BU L
Rev 813, 839 (1998) (referring to groups as entities that adopt norms).
See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Government and the Theory of Groups (Harvard

6

1965); see also Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex L
Rev 873, 883-901 (1987).
Students of private legal systems (hereinafter PLS) have arguably gone furthest among legal

7

scholars to study the dynamics and the roles of groups qua groups. Lisa Bernstein offers perhaps
the best examples of such efforts. See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Private CommercialLaw in the
Colton Industry: Creating Cooperationthrough Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001).
In the latter study of the nature and operation of the cotton industry, Bernstein considers the
organization and structure of two leading trade associations, see id at 1726, as well as the social
dynamics among their members, see id at 1750-51. Other PLS analysis of groups can be found in
the work of Gillian Hadfield. See, for example, Gillian K. Hadfield, PrivatirngCommercial Law:
Lessons From ICANN, 6 J Small & Emerging Bus L 257 (2002). This attention to groups is hardly
surprising, given the important role that private groups now play across an array of regulatory
fields. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U Pa L Rev 311, 369-70 (2002).
The most widely studied cases of such private lawmaking are the American Law Institute and the

4

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See, for example, Alan Schwartz
and Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595 (1995). Other
examples of private lawmaking have also been explored. See, for example, Gillian K. Hadfield,
PrivatirngCommercalLaw, Regulation 40 (Spring 2001), available online at <http://www.cato.org/
pubs/regulation/regv24n1/hadfield.pdf> (visited Mar 29, 2005).
8

9

Sensitivity to groups has also been a central facet of some antitrust analysis. See, for example,
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Stniking a Delicate Balance: Intelkctual Property, Antitrust, Contract, and
Standardizationin the Computer Industry, 12 Harv J L & Tech 1, 5 (1998) ("Antitrust law has always
been concerned with group activities, particularly activities among horizontal competitors."). At
the other extreme, quite diffuse forms of group action have also been explored by legal scholars.
One might conceive of the incorporation strategy of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), for
example, as creating a formally sanctioned role for groups in the evolution of norms. See Kraus,
26 J Legal Studies 377 (cited in note 4). When commercial norms are enforced under the UCC,
norms are effectively being disseminated. This constitutes group action, however, only in the
vaguest sense.
Among the notable exceptions are Steve Bainbridge, Eric Posner, Mark Seidenfeld, and Cass
Sunstein. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmakingin CorporateGovernance, 55
Vand L Rev 1 (2002); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U Chi L Rev 133 (1996); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing Social
Conformity, and JudicialReview of Agengy Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L Rev 486, 526-43 (2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L J 71 (2000). Other
contributions, somewhat less directed to actual groups, might also be noted. See, for example,
Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 Va L Rev 247

Summer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

in fact directed to what Eric Posner has termed "categories" of actors"collection[s] of people who happen to share some characteristic ...but who do
not necessarily cooperate with each other"-rather than "groups""collection[s] of people who choose to cooperate."' Perhaps for this reason,
much of the study of groups tends to divest them of any independent character.
Individual group members remain the relevant agents and appropriate subjects
of analysis, rather than the impliedly accidental collectives in which they happen
to come together."
Not surprisingly, given this state of affairs, legal analysts have only rarely
focused on the dynamics of change within and among groups: How might the
internal dynamics of groups drive norm transformation among their individual
members? Might a group amount to something more-or at least differentthan the sum of its parts? What are the external functions of groups? We have
thus failed to attend to questions of how groups actually work.
Consideration of a dynamic role for groups may be especially appropriate
with regard to the transformation of norms. Norms have been observed by
numerous scholars to resist efficient change.' 2 Sticky norms, locked in by virtue
(1999); Alex Geisinger, A Group Identi.y Theoy of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 Tulane L Rev
605 (2004); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to ContractLaw, 10 J Legal Studies 349 (1981); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountabiliy, 89
Georgetown L J 797 (2001); Thomas 0. McGarity, The InternalStructure ofEPA Rulemaking, 54 L
& Contemp Probs 57 (1991); Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 Cal L Rev 75 (2004). Minimally, this Essay
seeks to highlight these relatively disconnected efforts at legal analysis of groups, and encourage
their integration in a coherent legal literature of groups.
Outside the legal scholarship, but widely cited within it, relevant group analysis includes the
literature of group decision making following from the work of Kenneth Arrow, see Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (John Wiley 2d ed 1963), and that part of interest group
analysis that looks to the composition and features of distinct interest groups in gauging their
likely influence, see Olson, The Logic of Collective Action at 33, 48 (cited in note 5). Separately, it
bears noting that there has been extensive study of groups in cognitive psychology and
management theory. See, for example, Daniel C. Feldman, The Development and Enforcement of Group
Norms, 9 Academy Mgmt Rev 47 (1984); Jack A. Goncalo, Past Success and Convergent Thinking in
Groups: The Role of Group-FocusedAfttibutions, 34 Eur J Soc Psych 385 (2004). Finally, the growing
attention to social networks-including Robert Putnam's now proverbial bowling leaguesshould also be noted. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Ameican
Communiy (Simon & Schuster 2000).
'0 See Posner, 63 U Chi L Rev at 135 (cited in note 9).
"

12

Even in the analysis of interest groups, little attention is ordinarily given to the coordinated
actions of groups.
See, for example, Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the
Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S Cal L Rev 277, 297-321 (2003); Gillette, 78 BU L Rev at
832-41 (cited in note 4); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
PsychologicalPower of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand L Rev 1583 (1998); Michael Klausner,
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of a variety of forces-from the microecononic influence of network effects to
cognitive tendencies toward inertia-may thus require intervention to induce
efficient change. 3
This Essay points to groups as potential tools in this pursuit, suggesting
they may offer an intermediate path of change between regulatory mandate and
decentralized markets. Using the recent change in sovereign debt contracting
practices by way of illustration, the Essay calls attention to the nature and
potential importance of groups-collectives with some defined membership,
which persist over time, exhibit a pattern of recurrent communication, and
encourage attention to such communication in the definition and exercise of
members' individual preferences. More specifically, it considers the relevance of
such collectives to efficient norm change. Where some pattern of private
behavior is at once inefficient but resistant to decentralized market change,
groups may effectively stand in for the market-relying on private rather than
public incentives to define outcomes, but offering an infrastructure of
coordination lacking in a pure market dynamic. Building on this conception, the
Essay offers a potential framework for the analysis of groups-as market
substitutes in their internal dynamics, as market mediating in their external
interactions, and, most counterintuitively, as contributing to norm change not
only in their strength, but in their failure.
Part I briefly reviews the course of recent change in sovereign debt
contracting norms. Drawing on the latter by way of illustration, the balance of
the Essay considers three potential dimensions of the role of groups in norm
change. 4 To begin, Part II explores the internal workings of groups: How might

13

Corporations,Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 789-815 (1995); Paul G.
Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution:Is the FittestNorm Effident?,
149 U Pa L Rev 2027 (2001); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Ineffi ient Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev
1697 (1996).
An emphasis on norms is also well warranted given their growing importance in legal analysis.
See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Dijputes (Harvard
1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich L Rev 338
(1997). More specifically, attention to norms is appropriate in the sovereign debt markets, given
the latter's reliance on actively traded portfolios. Standardization is essential to the efficiency of
such secondary trading. See Ahdieh, 76 S Cal L Rev at 288-96 (cited in note 12).

14

It bears clarifying that the "norms" of interest in the present analysis encompass any regularity of
private behavior, even if not grounded in a sense of obligation. In this regard, my analysis
attempts to speak to a broader category of what might be termed "conventions," and not only the
narrower universe of "social norms."
A word is in order regarding the scope of "groups," as the term is used herein. To begin with, I
do not attempt to distinguish among groups composed of public actors, private actors, or both.
While the three patterns I outline might vary at the margins, depending on the composition of the
group of interest, such deviations are unimportant to this introductory analysis. This is especially
likely to be true where the relevant public actors are acting as market participants of a sort. On a
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groups contribute to norm transformation among their members? To date, legal
scholars have offered little by way of response. Groups remain black boxes in
legal analysis, treated as nothing more than aggregations of their individual
membership."5 In this perspective, the collective creates no added value. By
contrast, I will suggest a pair of ways in which groups may produce internal
norm change: by facilitating coordination and by enhancing the quality of
decision making. In serving these functions, groups might be seen to serve as
substitutes, or proxies, for the market.
Part III considers the external face of groups, including interactions among
groups. While this has been a subject of greater attention among legal scholars, I
again suggest the utility of further study. By way of a preliminary effort, I suggest
potential roles for groups in facilitating negotiation across categories of market
participants, in balancing power across such categories, and in internalizing
network externalities. In each of these roles, groups serve a market-mediating
function.
Finally, I conclude in Part IV, by briefly considering "group failure" as a
third dimension of the role of groups in norm change. I posit that the
conventional tendency to conceive norm change as coordination around a new
norm overlooks a countervailing story of norm change-the abandonment of an
existing norm. In this "loser's history" of sorts, groups may also have a role to
play. The relevant predictor of norm change is no longer the effort of groups to
facilitate change, however, but their inability to hang together.
This Essay seeks to sketch the preliminary outlines of a story in which
groups matter. Groups are something more than the sum of their parts, I will
suggest, or at least something different. Particularly in the unsticking of sticky
norms-a task for which legal scholars have commonly looked to "expressive
law" and individual "norm entrepreneurs"6-groups might also have a role to
play. Such lock-in of inefficient norms is especially likely, moreover, where

15

separate note, it also bears clarifying that many of the groups operating in the sovereign debt
markets are comprised not of individuals, but collective entities. Thus, the banks and investment
funds that populate most creditor groups are themselves "groups" of a sort. This wrinkdethough fascinating in its own right, as a question of organizational agency-is beyond the scope
of this overview Essay. So long as the relevant "collective" participates in the group with a single
voice, and is seen both internally and externally as a unitary actor, this complication can be left
aside for purposes of the present review.
See Blinder and Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One? at 2 (cited in note 3) (noting modeling of

16

firms as individual decisionmakers).
On the role of the state in altering norms, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Socia/Meaning and
SocialNorms, 144 U Pa L Rev 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Tbeoy of Expressive
Law, 86 Va L Rev 1649 (2000). On the potential impact of individuals, or "norm entrepreneurs,"
see Cass R. Sunstein, SodalNorms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev 903, 929 (1996).
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coordination is the dominant strategic imperative. 7 With increasing globalization
and a growing role for technology in the modern economy-each of which
depends upon patterns of convergence-such coordination is of ever increasing
importance. Given the nature of groups as mechanisms of coordination, then,
the importance of groups might also be expected to grow in the years ahead.' 8
I. STASIS AND CHANGE IN CONTRACTING NORMS
For much of the last century, sovereign bonds contracts issued under New
York law-the majority of sovereign debt issuances, particularly by emerging
markets-have included a term mandating the unanimous consent of all
bondholders to any change in the financial terms of the relevant bond issue.' 9
Although such unanimous action clauses were not required in sovereign debt
contracts, contracting party deviations from the norm of including them were all
but unheard of under New York law.2" For almost as long as they have been
included, however, unanimous action requirements have been seen to create

19

See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S Cal L Rev 215,
229-45 (2004); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: InternationalReview of Naional
Courts, 79 NYU L Rev 2029, 2094 (2004).
Evidence of the importance of groups can readily be found across the international financial
order. One might begin with an example referenced by Anna Gelpern in this volume-the Paris
Club of government-to-government creditors. Notwithstanding its lack of formal status, the Paris
Club has played a central role in sovereign debt restructuring for nearly fifty years. See Anna
Gelpern, Why Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 Chi J Ind L 391 (2005). The
importance of groups is further suggested by the efforts of market participants to secure
membership in particular groups, including Russia's only partially successful attempt to join the
G-7, producing the sometimes schizophrenic existence of the "G-7/8." Debates about the
appropriate design of collective governance in the international financial order are also suggestive.
See C. Fred Bergsten, The G-20 and the World Economy (Mar 4, 2004), available online at
<http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/bergsten0304-2.htm> (visited Mar 29, 2005) (arguing
for displacement of G-7 with more broadly representative G-20). The recurrent emergence of
new groupings-such as the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, which emerged to
coordinate Argentine creditors-may also point to groups' importance. Finally, if less
substantively, one might note the competition over group appellations, as in the joint developedcountry/emerging-market G-20 versus the competing developing country G-20, which famously
scuttled the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003.
See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the

20

InternationalOrder,53 Emory LJ 691, 698-702 (2004).
By contrast, bond contracts issued under English law have-for just as long and just as

17

18

consistently-been drafted with "majority" action clauses, permitting amendment of financial
terms by a supermajoity of owners of the relevant bond issue. In a handful of cases, moreover,
such majority action provisions were included in New York law bonds, though seemingly on
account of scrivener's errors. See Anthony J. Richards and Mark Gugiatti, The Use of Colkctive
Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers aJuly 11, 2003) (Draft).
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inefficient barriers to debt restructuring-an all-too-common occurrence among
sovereign debtors. 2
Such inefficiency arises from the collective action obstacles UACs place on
the ability of sovereign debtors to make their own "fresh start." With UACs,
holdout creditors can reasonably be expected to resist participation in any agreed
restructuring, absent the inducement of side payments outside the collective
agreement. 22 This prospect may unduly delay either the decision to pursue
needed restructuring, or the completion of that process. In the worst case
scenario, it could deter the participation needed for restructuring to occur at all.
Stating it differently, UACs and the resulting potential for holdouts may increase
transaction costs and reduce predictability in sovereign debt restructuring.2 3
Given the foregoing, unanimous action requirements may also increase the
moral hazards of sovereign debt finance. By delaying, if not preventing, efficient
sovereign debt restructuring, UACs may increase the prospect of international
bailouts-a recurrent response to emerging market financial crises in the 1990s.
The latter prospect, in turn, encourages the moral hazard of looser restraints
both in creditor lending and debtor borrowing, with attendant efficiency losses.2 4

22

See G. Mitu Gulati and Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus Law 635, 642-43 (2001); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankrupty ReorganiZation Approach, 85 Cornell L Rev
956, 960-61 (2000).
See Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual

23

Performance, 89 J Pol Econ 615 (1981). Sovereign debt restructuring can be modeled as a standardform Prisoner's Dilemma game among creditors. In this familiar dynamic, a creditor will secure a
higher payoff if he, and he alone, defects from an agreed restructuring plan by demanding a side
payment for his participation. If all creditors act on this common incentive, however, the ultimate
payoff to each creditor is lower than if none had defected. One may minimize defection in
Prisoner's Dilemma games, however, through repeat plays. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation 10-11 (Basic Books 1984); Richard L. Revesz, CongressionalInfluence on JudicialBehavior?
An EiricalExamination of Challenges to Agent7 Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 NYU L Rev 1100, 1111
(2001). In essence, if a given participant knows that he will participate in the game recurrently, the
return on any single defection, even if successfully executed (in other words, even if other players
do not respond by altering their strategy), is dwarfed by the losses that follow from the relevant
player's subsequent inability to secure agreements with its counterparts. In repeat Prisoner's
Dilemma games, thus, defection ceases to be a productive strategy.
See Celeste Boeri, Development, How to Solve Argentina's Debt Crisis: Will the IMFs Plan Work?, 4

24

Chi J Intl L 245, 248 (2003); Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Colkctive
Will, 51 Emory LJ 1317, 1351 (2002).
On the inefficiencies of UACs, see generally Marcel Kahan, Rethinking CorporateBonds: The Trade-

21

Off between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 NYU L Rev 1040, 1054-56 (2002); Schwarcz, 85
Comell L Rev at 960-62, 980, 1004 n 279 (cited in note 21). But see Nouriel Roubini and Brad
Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to FinancialCrises in Emering Economies 167-69 (Institute for
International Economics 2004) (challenging conventional assumption of UAC barriers to efficient
debt restructuring). Notably, the collective action challenges of the sovereign debt market grew in
the 1990s, with a shift from repeat-player bank financing to the use of more widely held and
readily tradable bonds-a shift driven by the emerging market debt crises of the 1980s. See
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Citing these successive inefficiencies of unanimous action requirements, an
array of academics and practitioners, developed countries, and official sector
institutions, including the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), began to press
for abandoning the practice of including UACs in New York law bonds. The
industrialized nations collectively highlighted this need with the G-10's call for
the replacement of UACs with collective action clauses in 1996.25
Encouragement from other international and national organizations and groups,
as well as individual attorneys, economists, and others, followed. Yet the
contracting parties manifested little interest in change. 6 Exhibiting the patterns
of network effect lock-in, cognitive inertia, and information failure predicted in
the economics and legal scholarship, 27 new and restructured sovereign debt
contracts issued under New York law continued to include UACs.
Faced with this resistance, in November 2001, the IMF proposed a
restructuring of the international financial architecture, by introduction of a far
more extensive bankruptcy regime for sovereign states. Specifically, the IMF
proposed the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM")
to facilitate efficient debt restructuring and thereby minimize the need for the
massive international bailouts that had littered the 1990s. 28 Not surprisingly, the
SDRM was not greeted with open arms. Market participants, from issuers to
creditors and beyond, challenged the need for what was seen as a radical
reshaping of the sovereign debt regime.
In resisting the SDRM, sovereign debt market participants exhibited a
notable tendency to join together in organized networks, committees, and other
groups based on their preference for maintenance of the status quo or a shift to
one or another type of CAC. These groups, some preexisting and some
emerging in direct or indirect response to the SDRM proposal, included nearly
every category of sovereign debt market participant. Issuers, underwriters, and
both buy-side and sell-side creditors; counsel to each of the latter groups; official
generally William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of
Creditors, 57 Vand L Rev 1 (2004); see also Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in
Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L J 929, 939 (2004);

James A. Dorn, InternationalFinancialCrises: What Rolefor Government?,23 Cato J 1, 3 (2003); Ronald

25

J. Silverman and Mark W. Deveno, DistressedSovereign Debt: A Creditor's Perspective, 11 Am Bankr
Inst L Rev 179, 179-80, 183--84 (2003).
See Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign L'quidipv Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors
Prepared under the Auspices of the Deputies (May 1996), available online at <http://www.bis.org/
publ/gten03.pdf> (visited Mar 29, 2005); see also Jack Boorman, Alternative Approaches to Sovereign

Debt Restrmcturing, 23 Cato J 59, 65 (2003); Anna Gelpem, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign
26

Debt, 22 Intl Fin L Rev 19 (May 2003).
See Brad Setser, The PoliclEconomy of Sovereign Bankrupty 20 (Jan 1, 2005) (Draft).

27

For a sample of this scholarship, see note 12.

28

See Boorman, 23 Cato J at 62 (cited in note 25).
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sector institutions; and developed economies such as the United States-all were
represented by group or committee. 9 Many, in fact, were represented by a
multiplicity of sometimes competing groups. Within each group, however,
membership was sufficiently constrained, so as to permit active and direct
communication.
The "spaghetti bowl" of sovereign debt-related networks, committees, and
groups 3" began with a number of relatively more formal ones. The Institute for
International Finance ("IIF"), an association of major financial institutions, and
the Emerging Markets Traders Association ("EMTA"), a varied group of
creditors and affiliated institutions, are examples. The sovereign parties,
variously collected as the G-7, the G-8, and the G-20, also came together in a
relatively formal fashion.31 Relevant groups also included less formal networks,
however, such as meetings among partners in the major New York law firms
with sovereign debt business, the Council on Foreign Relations' Roundtable on
Country Risk Analysis in the Post-Asia Crisis, and the Emerging Markets
Eminent Persons Group ("EMEPG").32 Additionally, certain groups joined
together in yet larger arrays. Again, more structured "groups of groups" can be
identified, such as the "Gang of Seven,"33 as can less structured interactions.34
Overall, whether singly or in tandem with other groups, coordinated
networks of sovereign debt market participants produced a flurry of discussion
and activity focused on the norms of sovereign debt contracting, especially in
29

Some networking of national banks might also be noted. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Ordernor

30

Chaos: The Legal Structure of Soveregn Debt Workouts, 53 Emory L J 657, 678 (2004).
See Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration, and Democray

31

290 (MIT 1998) (describing intertwined regional trade agreements as creating a "spaghetti bowl"
of trade rules).
Even among sovereign parties, informal groups emerged, including the developing country-

32

specific G-20, the G-22, and the G-33.
Some have even posited the various attorneys and economists, from various institutions and

33

34

countries, sharing some common connection to Lee Buchheit, one of the leading sovereign debt
attorneys in New York, to be a grouping of sorts.
The Gang of Seven-sometimes diminished to the Gang (or Group) of Six, without the Institute
for International Finance ("11F")-arose from the occasional coordination among seven creditor
groups: the Emerging Market Traders Association ("EMTA"); the International Primary Market
Association ("IPMA"); the Bond Market Association ("BMA'), the Securities Industry
Association ("SIA'); the International Securities Market Association ("ISMA"); the Emerging
Markets Creditors Association ("EMCA"), and the HF. Other groups in the sovereign debt
markets included the G-10 and INSOL International, an association of international accountants
and lawyers specializing in turnarounds and insolvency.
The Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders thus brought together a variety of subgroups,
including Task Force Argentina ("TFA"), representing Italian retail investors in Argentine bonds;
the Argentina Bondholders Committee ("ABC'), comprised of institutional investors; and the
Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency ("ABRA'), representing European retail investors.
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the aftermath of the SDRM proposal. Groups convened regularly, engaged in
dialogue, exchanged information, and both evaluated and offered arguments in
support of competing policies. In particular, CACs gained further support, as a
variety of sovereign debt committees and collectives took a position favoring
their adoption, offering competing model clauses, and the like.
Yet still, there appeared to be little indication of imminent change. Most
significantly, sovereign issuers exhibited little interest in replacing UACs with
CACs in their bond issues. In February 2003, however, the sticky norms
favoring the use of assertedly inefficient UACs finally came unstuck. Taking the
markets by surprise, Mexico announced its intention to offer a $1 billion bond
issue under New York law, using CACs instead of UACs. The new bond
contracts, Mexico indicated, would permit amendment of basic terms, including
approval of a mere 75 percent of
all-important payment and timing terms, upon 35
outstanding.
amounts
principal
debt
aggregated
Even more significant, however, was what came next. With Mexico's
decision, a norm that had seemed impervious to change only months before
suddenly became a thing of the past. As if on cue (or by regulatory obligation),
the tide completely turned toward CACs. Mexico issued a further $2.5 billion in
CAC bonds in April 2003. Uruguay quickly followed, offering an exchange of its
existing UAC bonds for new bonds with CACs. Within weeks, Brazil issued $1
36
billion in CAC bonds, becoming the first speculative grade issuer to use CACs.
year, Argentina
South Africa and South Korea followed Brazil, and late in the 37
announced that it too would include CACs in its new debt issues.
By the end of 2003, consequently, the contracting norms under New York
law had undergone a wholesale shift, now dictating the incorporation of
collective action clauses, where they had demanded unanimous action provisions
only months before. This unexpected and abrupt change in norms was decisively
affirmed in 2004, with Chile, Venezuela, the Philippines, Panama, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Israel all issuing bonds containing CACs for the first
time. By October 2004, CACs were "included in 42 percent of the stock of
external sovereign debt issued by emerging markets." 38 After nearly a century of
35

36

See Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer, and Ashoka Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps 3, 9
(Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, No PB03-05), available online at <http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/pbcpapers/2003/pb03-05.pdf> (visited Mar 29, 2005).
Perhaps as a result, Brazil's CACs deviated from prior precedent, setting an 85 percent threshold
for restructuring, rather than the previously utilized 75 percent. See id at 20.

37

38

Other countries also shifted to CACs in 2003. See Choi and Gulati, 53 Emory L J at 945, 949
(cited in note 24). These included South Korea, South Africa, Turkey, Peru, Belize, Guatemala,
Italy, and Poland.
The Main Wire, U.S. 'sSnow to IMFC: IMF Should Hone Surveillance Role (Oct 2, 2004). It bears
noting that a small number of countries have issued New York law bonds with UACs since
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adherence to norms favoring the use of UACs, years of unrequited pressure on
New York law issuers to shift from UACs to CACs, and every reasonable
expectation that nothing would change anytime soon, it did-overnight.
Given the flurry of group activity in sovereign debt contracting that
preceded this unexpected-yet wholesale-shift, coordinated group action may
well have played a role.3 9 The transformation of sovereign debt contracting
norms thus allows us to explore the role of groups in norm change generally. In
particular, three dimensions of groups' contribution to norm shifts might be
considered: First, groups may serve an internal role in norm change, by
coordinating and enhancing the decisions of their own members-tasks
ordinarily left to decentralized markets, but perhaps alternatively facilitated by
groups. Second, groups may have an external-facing role, in the general sense of
promoting the policy preferences of their members, but perhaps particularly in
facilitating interaction with other groups. Finally, the inability of certain groups
to hold together might also contribute to norm change. Each of these roles for
groups in norm transformation, as illustrated in the shift from UACs to CACs,
will be considered in turn.
II.

COORDINATION AND TRANSFORMATION: THE INTERNAL

FUNCTIONS OF GROUPS

At the most basic level, groups facilitate norm change among their
members. In this internal dynamic, groups are market substitutes of a sort. They
offer a type of structured market. In the group interactions on the sovereign debt
markets, thus, private incentives-rather than public ones-remained at the
fore. Yet those incentives played themselves out not on the autonomous and
anonymous playing field of the market, but within the more structured, or
stylized, framework of groups. 4

39

40

Mexico's announcement. See Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, What Drives Changes in Boilerplate
Contracts?,16 (Jan 13, 2005) (Draft).
One might posit groups to have played a limited role in the post-Mexico turn to CACs, as
opposed to Mexico's own decision to shift. The tipping of the market, thus, might have been a
purely market-driven response to the new information offered by Mexico's successful issue. Yet
this point should not be overstated. Even before Mexico's shift, the use of English law majority
action clauses offered significant information about the viability of CAC issuances, limiting the
extent of the new information offered by Mexico's issue. Moreover, the relevant pool of
information remained incomplete even after Mexico's issue, given Mexico's relatively strong risk
profile. As such, not only Mexico's move, but the ensuing shift, requires more explanation than
the market alone can offer.
In the face of potential shortcomings of both markets and mandate as sources of coordination,
see Part ILA, I have previously suggested a constrained role for public authorities in encouraging
coordination, through the mechanism of "regulatory cues." See Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev 215 (cited
in note 17). Unlike conventional regulation, such cues are noncoercive. In a cueing analysis, thus,
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After outlining this conception of groups immediately below, the ensuing
subsections consider what it might mean for the role groups play. Specifically, I
offer two potential market-substituting functions of groups. First, groups may
help to facilitate coordination among their members; second, they may enhance
the quality, and hence the efficiency, of collective decision making. While
markets are our conventional means to these ends, groups may serve to advance
them as well.
A. GROUPS AS MARKET SUBSTITUTES
Norm change, or at least decentralized norm change, is ultimately a process
of coordination. At least in some circumstances, however, including particularly
where an existing norm must be displaced, decentralized markets may not
produce efficient norm change.41 Transition may be delayed, if it occurs at all;
when it does occur, the resulting norms may not be pareto optimal. Norms have
thus been posited to be particularly susceptible to lock-in, externalities, and
related inefficiencies.4 2
Yet the displacement of private incentives with public ones-a shift from
occasionally ineffective market mechanisms of norm change to the somewhat
oxymoronic alternative of state-mandated norm change-may be no more likely
to produce desirable results. Doubts have long been raised about regulators'
capacity to elect technical standards for the telecommunications industry, for
digital technologies, and for the internet. Such doubts would seem equally
applicable to the selection of contracting norms, such as those explored herein.
In each area, a complex array of factors, subject to rapid change, calls into
question the reliance on state action to relieve the shortcomings of the market.
In the face of this dilemma, consideration of intermediate institutional
designs is appropriate. Specifically, one might look to an institutional scheme
that draws selectively from each pole in the choice of mandate or markets. Such

public intervention milder than ordinary regulation serves as the source of coordination. At the
other end of the spectrum, one might conceive of groups as facilitating coordination through
something slightly more structured than ordinary markets. If cues are a modified form of regulation,
groups may be a modified form of the market.

41

One might also see regulatory cues as tied to an analysis of groups in a slightly different fashion.
Specifically, one might construe such cues as being directed to (or at least received by) either of
two alternative subjects: Cues might be seen to offer market participants generally a focal point for
their individualized strategic choices, thereby indirectly increasing the likelihood of coordinated
outcomes. See Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 247-55 (cited in note 17). In the alternative, however,
regulatory cues might also be seen as signals to groups to come together to coordinate efficient
change.
See Ahdieh, 53 Emory LJ at 721-28 (cited in note 19); see also note 12.

42

See note 12.
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a scheme would offer greater infrastructure for coordination, yet continue to rely
on the interplay of private incentives. In this way, it would alleviate the
shortcomings of each of the more conventional alternatives.
In technical standard setting, market participants and scholars alike have
appreciated this insight, and have increasingly turned to groups of various sorts
to shape standards. There has consequently emerged a conception of three idealtype mechanisms of standardization. a3 Standardization through market
evolution, or de facto standardization, begins with companies' independent
development of varied technologies. If "one [technology] 'wins out' in [the]
Darwinian competition for survival" of the marketplace, that technology
becomes the standard, and other minority technologies die out.44 Most
significantly for our purposes, this process is characterized by noncooperative
behavior, because "[a]ctors in the process do not enter agreements to cooperate
but may respond to the actions or expectations of other actors. 45
The obvious alternative to de facto standardization is the top-down
imposition of standards by an authoritative entity, whether the government per
se or some officially sanctioned standard-setting body.46 Unlike defacto standards,
such dejure standards are generally mandatory.
Yet standardization analysis and practice also identify a third mechanism of
standard setting, in which "a market coalition cooperates to impose a
standard. 4 7 This hybrid process turns on cooperative behavior among market
participants; it "involves actors using formal procedures of committee
participation and voting to develop voluntary standards. 4 ' Development of the
voluntary DVD standard, through the coordinated efforts of major hardware

43

44

See M. Joseph Hinshaw, The Role of Standardization and Interoperability in Copyight Protection of
Computer Software, 4 Comm L & Poly 299, 304-05 (1999); Margaret Jane Radin, Online
StandardiZation and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 Fordham L Rev 1125, 1135-37 (2002)
(standards arise (1) "by promulgation or enactment: top-down imposition by an authoritative
entity"; (2) "through market evolution: bottom-up emergence through operation of market
forces"; or (3) "in a hybrid manner, through some combination of top-down imposition and
bottom-up emergence').
Radin, 70 Fordham L Rev at 1136 (cited in note 43).

46

Hinshaw, 4 Comm L & Poly at 304 (cited in note 43).
See Marcus Maher, An Analysis of Internet StandardiZation, 3 Va J L & Tech 5 (1998); see also

47

Hinshaw, 4 Comm L & Poly at 305 (cited in note 43); Radin, 70 Fordham L Rev at 1135-36
(cited in note 43).
Radin, 70 Fordham L Rev at 1136 (cited in note 43).

48

Hinshaw, 4 Comm L & Poly at 304-05 (cited in note 43). Such standards may or may not be

45

mandatoryforgroupmembers upon their adoption. See id. See also Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner,
Coordinationthrough Committees and Markets, 19 RAND J Econ 235 (1988).
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manufacturers and movie studios, is a ready example of this approach.4 9 Internet
standards are similarly developed by a bewildering array of groups, from the
IETF and IESG, to the W3C and CNRI.5 0 Analysis of such group standard
setting has generally found it to be effective, and perhaps even preferable to the
alternatives of defacto or dejure standards."1
A pattern of technical standard setting by committee is readily extended to
a broader universe of group participation in the shaping of norms. Norms are
voluntary standards of a sort. This is readily appreciated with reference to the
sovereign debt contracting practices of interest herein-voluntary regularities of
behavior, undertaken to take advantage of benefits expected to accrue from use
of a widespread contract term. The efforts of groups such as the Emerging
Market Creditors Association ("EMCA"), the Gang of Seven, and the G-10 to
draft model collective action clauses, as well as EMTA's founding mission to
facilitate sovereign debt contract standardization generally, are thus forms of
standard setting. They seek to define a standard to be used thereafter by
participants in the relevant industry-not unlike the collective design of
standards for DVD technology.5 4
Of course, even if shaping sovereign debt contracting practices can be
understood as a form of standard setting, any analogy to technical standard
setting might nonetheless be questioned, based on the informality of many of
the groups involved in sovereign debt contracting. Technical standard-setting

50

See Neil Gandal, Compatibiliy,Standardization,and Network Effects: Some Policy Implications, 18 Oxford
Rev Econ Poly 80, 84 n 12 (2002).
See Maher, 3 Va J L & Tech at 53-54 (cited in note 46).

51

See, for example, Farrell and Saloner, 19 RAND J Econ 235 (cited in note 48).

52

See Klausner, 81 Va L Rev at 774-89 (cited in note 12); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Inteipretation

49

53

54

and Standardizationin ElectronicSales Contracts,53 SMU L Rev 1431, 1433-34 (2000) (describing role
of groups in facilitating changes in standards).
In their standard-setting efforts, certain sovereign debt groups may constitute "epistemic
communities" of sorts. In particular, lawyer groups might be seen as offering particular expertise
and competence in the standardization of contract terms and related norms. See Peter M. Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Poliq Coordination, 46 Intl Org 1, 3 (1992)
(defining "epistemic community" as "network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within
that domain").
Kahan and Klausner characterize various groups' efforts to create model bond terms-a direct
analog to the model CACs noted above-as a form of contract standard setting. See Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or 'The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va L Rev 713, 761-64 (1997) (noting International Swap and
Derivative Dealers Association and the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware state bar as
groups attempting standard setting for bond contracts). Kahan and Klausner identify the role of
these groups as striking an appropriate-and regularly adjusted-balance between standardization
and customization of contract terms. See id.

Summer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternaionalLaw

groups, by contrast, tend to be mote formal in nature. There are formal groups
in sovereign debt contracting, including the IIF, EMTA, and INSOL
International, yet much of the group activity is looser in nature.
Less formalized groupings, however, may also help to set standards. 5 In
fact, even seriatim communications among market participants will sometimes
constitute a form of group interaction, if group members call the same
counterparts, with some regularity, and construe the resulting information as
significant inputs into their own standard selection.56 The repeat player attorneys
in the sovereign debt markets, for example, engage in some recurrent
communication with one another.57 While quite informal, these interactions-in
the form of paired conversations, and perhaps occasional cross-firm partner
meetings-may significantly influence the individual choice of standards by
participants.58
More broadly, even absent recurrent interaction and close attention to the
results of such interaction, the simple fact of communication lends the informal
patterns of engagement in the sovereign debt and similar markets a group-like
character. Such interaction, including among various public and private
attorneys, is cooperative, rather than noncooperative, in nature. In a market

55

56

A prime example is the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, which serves critical
functions in the sovereign debt markets, notwithstanding its lack of official status. On the Paris
Club, see note 18.
Given an active revolving door between public institutions in the sovereign debt marketswhether national or supranational-and private institutions, communication among associates
who are occasionally situated across institutional lines is quite common. See, for example, Setser,
PolicalEconoyat 4 (cited in note 26) (describing revolving door between US Treasury's Office of
General Counsel and New York law firms); see also note 32. This flags a related, but distinct,
characteristic of the sovereign debt markets. As manifest in the SDRM debate and the ensuing
transition to CACs, prominent individual actors have played critical, and often unique, roles in the
market. From national officials such as Paul O'Neill and John Taylor to IMF officers such as
Anne Krueger, and from prominent creditor representatives (including Charles Dallara, Michael
M. Chamberlin, and other heads of the creditor groups) to selected emerging market finance
ministers, a handful of individuals emerge recurrently in discussions of the sovereign debt
market's transition. Given the aforementioned revolving door, they may occasionally change hats,
but they continue to play a part.

57

58

This pattern includes not only communications among private practitioners, but also close contact
between both the US Treasury's Office of General Counsel and the IMF's legal department, and
the New York sovereign debt bar. See Setser, PoliticalEconomy at 4 (cited in note 26).
See, for example, Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 6 (Feb 3,
2005) (Draft) (describing feedback from array of market participants in shaping IMF's SDRM
proposal). Even the most attenuated communications might be thought of in "group" terms, if
they are undertaken with communicative intent and are lent particular attention by relevant
market participants. One might think of the decision of Brazil to impose an 85 percent standard
for amendment of financial terms in its first post-Mexico bond as an example. When others failed
to follow, Brazil backtracked to the 75 percent standard.
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dynamic, participants elect choices without opportunity for direct interchange
with their counterparts. "Actors in the process do not enter agreements to
cooperate but may respond to the actions or expectations of other actors."59 The
market is the mediator of any interchange.6" A dimension of direct
coordination-even if only ad hoc-thus constitutes a sea change in the
interaction of private actors. The flowering of direct coordination-both in
more and less structured fora, and in multipolar and bipolar forms-after the
proposed creation of the SDRM is thus properly understood as an explosion in
group activity.
In some circumstances, then, groups help to structure interactions among
individual market participants. This may be especially likely given a certain
market structure. Where the relevant market encompasses only a small number
of actors, groups may offer little by way of valuable infrastructure. On the other
hand, a sufficiently large population of market participants might undermine the
capacity of groups to provide effective institutionalization. Groups may be most
likely to prosper, then, where we have something less than a dispersed market,
yet sufficiently broad participation to make unstructured coordination difficult.
Where the latter conditions arise, I would suggest, groups may serve as
market substitutes in at least two respects. Most obviously, groups may facilitate
coordination among market participants, where the market does not, or perhaps
cannot, adequately do so.61 Additionally, groups may serve a market efficiency
function, by enhancing the quality of aggregate decision making. Each of these
market substituting functions of groups will be described in turn.
B. THE COORDINATING FUNCTION OF GROUPS
Groups help to facilitate the coordination necessary for efficient norm
transformation. Where coordination is the relevant strategic imperative, groups

59
60

61

Hinshaw, 4 Comm L & Poly at 304 (cited in note 43).
See Robert C. Clark, The InterdisdcpAnary Study of Legal Evoluion, 90 Yale L J 1238, 1246 (1981)
(contrasting legal evolution where "there is a real bargaining game going on," rather than "just
various parties' unilateral selections of legal options that are advantageous in market
transactions'). To related effect, Farrell and Saloner contrast market versus committee standard
setting as respectively characterized by sequential versus simultaneous product choice. See Farrell
and Saloner, 19 RAND J Econ 235 (cited in note 48); see also Gillette, 52 SMU L Rev at 1433-34
(cited in note 52).
See Landa, 10 J Legal Studies at 350 (cited in note 9) (offering theory of ethnically homogenous
middleman groups as "low-cost club-like institutional arrangement, serving as an alternative to
contract law and the vertically integrated firm, which emerged to economize on contractenforcement and information costs in an environment where the legal infrastructure was not well
developed").
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provide a structured scheme for its achievement.6 2 They do so in both
operational and more fundamental ways, which I consider in turn.
At an operational level, groups may contribute in at least three ways to
norm transition. First, they serve as nodes for negotiation. Second, they may
help to address collective action obstacles to coordination. Finally, they
introduce a dimension of hierarchical ordering valuable for the transition
process.
Taking these in order, the role of groups as nodes of interaction and
resulting negotiation among market participants is readily illustrated in the
sovereign debt markets. Active and direct discussions preceded successive shifts
in positions on the introduction of CACs, including meetings of formal groups
such as the 11F and EMTA, of the developed countries of the G-10, and, it has
been suggested, of the attorneys responsible for sovereign debt contract
drafting. Other coordinative groups-such as the Council on Foreign Relations'
Roundtable on Country Risk Analysis in the Post-Asia Crisis-also offered
meeting places for market participants.
Such intragroup communication can be understood to serve a transaction
cost-reducing function.6 3 Especially given dispersed players, a structure for
communication may be necessary to coalesce relevant incentives and
preferences. Groups, often with their own subgroups, subcommittees, and the
like, can effectively serve this purpose. 64 But groups may also serve as nodes of
negotiation in a deeper sense-not merely physical, but also conceptual. Like
focal points-which Thomas Schelling posited to facilitate coordination, by dint

62

On the importance of coordination, see Ahdieh, 53 Emory L J at 729-30 (cited in note 19). On

63

the role of groups in coordination, see Kahan and Klausner, 83 Va L Rev at 736 n 57 (cited in
note 54) (suggesting sources of standards coordination, including groups).
See Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmakingand Dipute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: An

64

Essay in Trade Governance, 18 Mich J Intl L 357, 364 (1997) (noting reduction of transaction costs
by "facilitative organizations"); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Acion in the Utilization of Shared
Freshwater.The Challenges ofInternationalWater Resources Law, 90 Am J Intl L 384, 412 (1996).
The International Organization for Standardization (hereinafter ISO), for example, draws
together standard-setting groups from each participating nation and disperses these
representatives into subgroups with varied subject-matter responsibilities. Offering standardsetting expertise across an array of areas, the ISO arose, at least in part, as a response to the
emergence of "uncoordinated corporate environmental quality programs and eco-labeling
schemes." See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The InternationalOrgani!ationfor
Standardizaionand Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 Ecol L Q 479, 491 (1995); see
also id at 497-99. With its significant number of subject-matter and expertise-oriented subgroups,
the ISO has emerged as a leading transnational standard-setting body. See id at 489. It has
maximized the prospect of effective coordination, furthermore, by demanding that the national
standards organizations selected as ISO members be the "most representative" standards
organization in the participating country. See id at 523. But see id at 524-25 (suggesting limits of
"balance" in participation).
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of their salience among competing equilibrium solutions-groups with some
existing set of policy positions may define boundaries for negotiations.6" In this
way, they may facilitate agreement.
Beyond their service as nodes of negotiation, the second way in which
groups may operationally contribute to norm transformation is by helping to
overcome collective action barriers to it. Few, if any, sovereign debt market
participants may have had the individual incentive to draft and promote
potential collective action provisions, given the overwhelming dominance of
UACs. On the other side of the debate, individual opponents of change may
have been similarly loathe to invest in resistance, given a seemingly widespread
sense of dismay with the status quo. Groups may have helped to overcome such
barriers to participation.6 6 Groups such as the G-7, the IIF, and EMCA were
thus in the forefront of the struggle between the status quo, CACs, and the
SDRM.
A final operational contribution of groups to beneficial coordination might
arise from the hierarchical design of groups such as the IIF and EMTA, each of
which combined a general membership with a dominant set of "principals" or
"full members." Such rank ordering may serve a signaling function in any
transformation of the norms of group members. Shifts among group leaders
may serve as prompts for broader shifts. Additionally, hierarchy may permit
conflict among group members to be minimized, and coordination thereby
advanced.67
Besides their operational roles as nodes of negotiation, as correctives to
collective action problems, and as sources of salutary hierarchy, groups may also
facilitate coordination in deeper-and perhaps more dynamic-ways. This role
of groups becomes evident in a closer analysis of the coordination game
dynamic at work within groups. Although game theory has been widely invoked
among legal scholars, applications have largely been limited to the Prisoner's
Dilemma. In Prisoner's Dilemma games, player incentives favor defection from
agreed regimes. Law intervenes to constrain allegedly inefficient exercises of
individual preference. By contrast, in so-called "coordination games," player
incentives favor coordination, or agreement. What is lacking are appropriate
expectations of the likely behavior of other parties. This is evident in the most
basic coordination game pattern-Schelling's Meeting Place game.

65

See Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 243-45 (cited in note 17); see also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy

66

of Conflict 53-75 (Harvard 1960).
See Olson, The Logic of Collective Acion at 33, 48 (cited in note 5); see also Thomas S. Ulen, The

67

Growing Painsof BebavioralLaw andEconomics, 51 Vand L Rev 1747, 1750-51 (1998).
See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 528 (cited in note 9).
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In the Meeting Place game, spouses separated in a department store want
to find each other, but cannot communicate. As such, each is left to predict
where the 68
other will expect them to go. Schematically, this dynamic is captured
as follows:
Husband
Main
Entrance
Wife

Main
Entrance
Information
Desk

10,10
0,0
0,0_10,10

Information
Desk
0,0
10,10

What players need in this game is accurate information regarding the likely
choice of their counterpart-in the relevant parlance, accurate expectations
regarding that choice. Absent such expectations, players face the prospect of
erroneous choice. Either the wife is alone at the
Main Entrance and the husband
69
is alone at the Information Desk, or vice versa.
Groups, of course, provide opportunity for communication. In a simple
Meeting Place dynamic, this alone should solve the game. Yet the game of
sovereign debt contracting--of norm transformation-is more complex than
finding a place to meet. Obviously, the relevant choices are less black and white.
More importantly, in addition to the coordinative, or cooperative, dimension at
work, there is also an element of competition.70 While I explore this balance or
68

By way of convention, I characterize payoffs as follows: row player, column player. In this game,

69

the wife's payoff is thus first, and the husband's second. Further, I use cardinal rather than ordinal
payoffs in order to distinguish the strength of preferences.
See Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 240 n 102 (cited in note 17). Where the relevant norm
transformation is a product of adjusted expectations-as opposed to an alteration in player
incentives--one might predict a greater influence for nonstate actors, including groups.
Incentives are reasonably understood to be stable. Some significant degree of pressure is likely to
be required for their alteration. By contrast, expectations may be more easily altered. Even the
noncoercive contributions of groups may produce desired change.

70

Especially given a more competitive strategic dynamic, it bears noting that group members need
not be equals in a coordination game. Rather, some are likely to be more equal than others.
Among issuer counsel, Lee Buchheit of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton has long held a
particularly prominent position. Among issuers themselves, at least in early 2003, Mexico may
have been especially well-positioned to lead a shift away from UACs. Mohamed EI-Erian may
similarly have been a dominant player among creditors, given the volume of emerging market
debt under his management. Such hierarchical ordering is hardly surprising. In fact, it is readily
incorporated into a coordination game analysis, whether through a first-mover analysis, a repeatplayer approach, or an appreciation of certain players' heightened capacity to shape others'
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coordination and competition in greater detail in Part III, as it is especially likely
to arise in the interaction of groups with nonmembers, it influences the internal
workings of groups as well. Thus, while the group comprised of sovereign
debtor counsel-attorneys at major firms in New York-desires beneficial
coordination, they also are in competition with one another for a scarce pool of
business. So long as coordination remains the dominant goal of group
members-so long as the utility of a common standard surpasses members'
preference for individually optimal standards-the basic coordinative dynamic
remains in place. 71 Yet the function of communication is now subtly different.
Given not only the greater complexity of intragroup communication about
sovereign debt contracting choices than communication about where to meet,
but also a more competitive dynamic behind such communication, internal
group interchange may now be as significant for how it shapes members'
expectations of future conduct, as for the information it offers on its face.72
Direct and indirect communication among sovereign debtors may thus have
suggested a growing receptivity to CACs. Expectations of an ultimate shift may
therefore have grown. With such expectations in place, Mexico's decision to
adopt CACs in early 2003 looks to be less of a surprise. Discussions within the
11F, EMCA, the Bond Market Association ("BMA"), and other creditorgroups in
advance of Mexico's decision may likewise have increased their expectations of a
shift. With these altered expectations, individual creditors might now express
greater receptivity to the use of CACs (or at least a diminished sense of the
importance of UACs) and could ultimately
embrace Mexico's decision to use
73
CACs in their February 2003 issue.

71

expectations of the coordination equilibrium that will ultimately emerge. See Amitai Aviram, A
Paradox of SpontaneousFormation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 Yale L & Poly Rev 1, 3437 (2004).
By contrast with Prisoner's Dilemma games, repeat plays may not directly resolve coordination

72

dilemmas, at least where the relevant questions of coordination are in flux. Even where the
coordination games of sovereign debt contracting are iterative in important respects,
consequently, coordination failures may persist. Repeat games may indirectly diminish the
prospect of coordination failure, however, by improving the accuracy of participants' expectations
of the likely moves of repeat players.
See Ahdieh, 53 Emory L J at 747-49 (cited in note 19); Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 239-41 (cited

73

in note 17).
One might also see groups as helping to reduce the perceived risks of moving to a new standard.
In essence, if participation in the dominant standard offers significant network benefits, then early
movers to a new, even preferable standard, run the risk of moving alone. See Ahdieh, 76 S Cal L
Rev at 306-11 (cited in note 12). Others may not follow, saddling the first mover with both the
costs of transition and the diminished network benefits of a less widespread standard. See id;
Gillette, 53 SMU L Rev at 1433-34 (cited in note 52); Maher, 3 Va J L & Tech at 26, n 36 (cited
in note 46).
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This brief sketch of the coordination game dynamic of groups points to
three substantive ways-beyond the operational contributions outlined abovein which groups may help to facilitate coordination. First, groups offer their
members an improved sense of the prevailing norms among similarly situated
market participants. 75 Through participation in EMCA, for example, individual
buy-side investors in the sovereign debt markets acquired a more complete view
of buy-side investors' receptivity to CACs.
Second, groups facilitate coordination through their provision of
information.76 Such information includes relevant factual data, but also potential
insights appreciated by some group members, but not others. 77 Most simply,
groups can enhance the quality of information by pooling information collection
efforts-and the information produced thereby. This reduces the risk of error,
and may even enhance the prospect of achieving pareto efficient results.78
Additionally, groups can improve information quality by facilitating
specialization among their members.7 9
Lastly, and most broadly, groups enhance coordination by shaping their
members' expectations regarding the future strategies of fellow group members.
Drawing on the evidence of prevailing norms, the factual information, and the
distinct perspectives noted above, among other things, groups allow their
members to develop more accurate expectations of future coordination
equilibria. With such expectations in hand, one would predict greater willingness
to abandon inefficient norms, such as UACs, that might otherwise persist.

74
75
76

See Geisinger, 78 Tulane L Rev at 618 (cited in note 9); Sunstein, 110 Yale LJ at 78 (cited in note
9) (describing analogous patterns as products of "reputational" and "informational" externalities).
See McAdams, 96 Mich L Rev at 360 (cited in note 13) (noting role of groups in publicizing
consensus around a particular norm).
A significant part of the work of standard-setting organizations involves just such an

78

informational function. See Maher, 3 Va J L & Tech at 26 (cited in note 46). The constituent
groups in the cotton industry are similarly oriented to information-provision. See Bernstein, 99
Mich L Rev at 1752-53 (cited in note 6).
See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 528 (cited in note 9). The perspectives of group members
bespeak something distinct from the aforementioned sense of prevailing norms. A sense of
prevailing norms may inform standard selection by individual group members. Information
regarding the distinct perspectives of varied group members, by contrast, not only informs
expectations in the coordination game of standard selection, but may also alter individual
preferences.
See Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at 22 (cited in note 9).

79

See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 532 (cited in note 9).
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C. THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF GROUPS
Groups' provision of evidence regarding prevailing norms, of factual
information, of member perspectives, and of reasons to alter expectations, then,
may enhance coordination. But groups may also do more. In serving these
internally directed functions, groups potentially become something more than
the sum of their parts, affirmatively altering the values of their members and
hence their norms of behavior. Rather than mere coordination, the internal
dynamic of groups may induce genuine change in the incentives and preferences
of group members, and in the character of the collective that they constitute. In
sovereign debt contracting, for example, interactions within the G-10 or among
the 1IF principals produced a consensus distinct from, and perhaps better than,
the autarkic views of their collected members.
Again, it is useful to consider the analogy to technical standard setting
organizations. While part of the role of such groups is to encourage
coordination around a particular standard, another role is the development and
elaboration of superior standards. This is readily evident in the work of the
International Organization of Standardization, which seeks to define
transnational standards in a variety of areas, including environmental
protection.8 ° The efforts of EMCA, the Gang of Seven, and the G-10 to draft
model CAC clauses can similarly be seen as designed not simply to coordinate
group members around a particular standard, but to help develop a better
standard.
The transformative capacity of groups has not been given adequate
attention in the legal literature. Yet recall the cichdd perception of two heads as
better than one. 8 Empirical analysis, particularly among students of management
and cognitive psychology, has offered a strong foundation for this view. Support
is also found in certain economic analysis, including an important study by Alan
Blinder and John Morgan.82 In a controlled experiment, Blinder and Morgan
sought to test the ability of individuals versus groups to detect a shift in the
relative probability of certain observed outcomes. Consistent with the aphorism,
80

On the role of the International Organization of Standardization, see note 64.

81

On the other hand, we should not overlook the contrary notion of groups as simply the sum of

82

their individual parts, see Geisinger, 78 Tulane L Rev at 617 (cited in note 9), and the even
harsher disparagement of the camel is a horse designed by committee, see Bainbridge, 55 Vand L
Rev at 12 (cited in note 9).
See Blinder and Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One? (cited in note 3); see also Alan B. Krueger,
A Study Shows Committees Can Be More than the Sum of Their Members, NY Times C2 (Dec 7, 2000).
For other favorable studies, see Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 530 (cited in note 9); see also
Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance:Are N + 1 Heads Better than One?, 91 Psych Bull
517 (1982). But see Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 532-33 (cited in note 9) (contending that the
"literature indicates that pooling [of group members' thoughts] is, at best, imperfect.").
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they found groups to be more accurate in their decision making than individuals
and, contrary to some conventional wisdom, no slower. This was true both with
simpler and more complex decision-making tasks. Blinder and Morgan,
moreover, seemed to observe a truly collective dynamic in group efforts. The
success of their groups was thus unrelated to the prior performance of their
individual members, including even their most able members.8 3
Some legal scholars have, in fact, called attention to a role for groups in
enhancing the quality of decision making. Mark Seidenfeld has considered a
variety of explanations for groups' improvement of decision making.84 In Why a
Board?, Steve Bainbridge focuses on the particular benefits of corporate boards.85
More generally, Jody Kraus has suggested the benefits of "social learning."8 6 The
incorporation strategy of the Uniform Commercial Code directs courts to look
to commercial norms in addressing ambiguities arising in contractual disputes.
This approach is well-justified, Kraus argues, given that social learning, arising
through imitation or teaching, is more efficient than individual learning, arising
from trial and error or rational calculation.
Groups might help to encourage norm change, then, through their
enhancement of the quality of decision making. This hypothesis is hardly
surprising, notwithstanding its relative disregard among legal scholars. Groups
represent something more than the sum of their parts. Their very existence
could therefore be a source of efficient norm change.87

84

See Blinder and Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One? (cited in note 3); see also Bainbridge, 55
Vand L Rev at 12, 21 (cited in note 9); Farrell and Saloner, 19 RAND J Econ 235 (cited in note
48) (demonstrating advantages of committee standard setting over decentralized market choice).
Seidenfeld points out that rather than actual learning, such studies may be capturing a simple
averaging of the knowledge of group members, or, at best, a pooling of their knowledge. See
Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 531 (cited in note 9). He acknowledges, however, that if actual
interaction is taking place, something stronger may be at work. See id at 532-34; see also
Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at 22-23 (cited in note 9) (noting evidence of more than averaging in
group decision making). Even if there is not actual improvement in the quality of decision
making, however, and all groups offer are the skills of their strongest members, this alone may be
quite beneficial. See Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at 26 (cited in note 9).
See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 530-35 (cited in note 9).

85

See Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev 1 (cited in note 9).

86

See Kraus, 26 J Legal Studies at 385-86 (cited in note 4). Note that the dynamic evaluated by

83

Kraus is distinct from the pattern of group action explored herein. In Kraus' analysis, there is no
functioning "group," as such.
87

Although the limitations of the present forum do not permit their close consideration, it bears
noting that groups may also negatively impact norm change, including the selection of efficient
norms. To begin with, groups may be more prone to inertia, or otherwise slower in their decision
making, than individuals. See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 528 (cited in note 9) (noting costs
and delays of group processes). But see Blinder and Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One? at 1
(cited in note 3) (using two laboratory experiments "to test the commonly-believed hypothesis
that groups make decisions more slowly than individuals do" and finding that "there is no
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For the range of reasons suggested above, the internal dynamics of groups
may have significant implications for norm transformation. To begin with,
groups can serve a coordinating role. Operationally, they act as nodes of
negotiation, remedies to collective action failures, and sources of hierarchical
ordering. They can also facilitate coordination in more fundamental ways,
through their provision of evidence of prevailing norms, of information
regarding the efficiency of those norms, and of grounds for altered expectations
regarding future equilibria. Beyond mere coordination, groups may encourage
norm transformation by enhancing the quality of decision making. As groups
coalesce into something more than the sum of their parts, they may encourage

significant difference in average decision lags."). Groups may also be overly cautious. See
Krueger, A Study Shows Committees, NY Times at C2 (cited in note 82) (quoting Robert MacCoun).
To related effect, groups may stymie effective brainstorming. See Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at
29 (cited in note 9); Michael Diehl and Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss in Brainstorming Groups:
Toward the Solution of a Riddle, 53 J Person & Soc Psych 497 (1987). A distinct difficulty of group
action is the potential for "social loafing," in which individual effort declines as group size
increases. See Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at 11 (cited in note 9); see also William W. Buzbee,
Recogniing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatoy Gaps,89 Iowa L Rev 1 (2003). Groups may
also be too quick to compromise. See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 528 (cited in note.9). Yet
the converse is also possible. As explored by cognitive psychologists, groups may be prone to
polarization, a tendency to move toward more extreme positions than those of the group's
individual members. See Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 535-38 (cited in note 9); Sunstein, 110
Yale L J at 71 (cited in note 9); see also notes 99-101 and accompanying text (noting Gang of
Seven creditor groups' adoption of relatively extreme position). Polarization is not problematic, of
course, so long as the relevant pole represents the efficient result. At least in some cases, however,
it may not. See Sunstein, 110 Yale LJ at 108 (cited in note 9).
Groups-including those in sovereign debt contracting-may likewise be prone to what Irving
Janis termed "groupthin"-"a dynamic in which the desire to be part of the group and to share
its values and prestige leads members to feel that the group is morally superior to its opponents,
to stifle dissent, and to fail to subject the group consensus to critical consideration." See
Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 541 (cited in note 9). Many groups in the sovereign debt markets
exhibit just the homogeneity, the institutional norms and design favoring predetermined
outcomes, and the perception of "a crisis situation in which there is high stress and little
opportunity for a decision that will improve the status quo," which portend the emergence of
groupthink. See id.
Finally, groups may also have some cartel quality to them. See Edward S. Mason, Economic
Concentration and the Monopoly Problem 73 (Harvard 1957) ("Cartels, in the narrow-and propersense, are agreements between firms in the same branch of trade limiting the freedom of these
firms with respect to the production and marketing of their products.'); see also Daniel E.
Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34 Ga L Rev 137 (1999)
(suggesting antitrust implications of standardization activities). Thus, groups may act to
inappropriately constrain their members, at least sometimes preventing moves to more efficient
norms. Even if they impose only soft constraints, as groups grow stronger, these may nonetheless
be significant barriers to efficient transition. As groups gain strength, moreover, they may also be
expected to seek to exercise their power to constrain nonmembers.
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the abandonment of inefficient norms and the identification of pareto efficient
ones.
In these paired coordination and learning functions, groups make visible
the invisible hand of the market. Groups do not displace private incentives with
public ones. Rather, they are driven by individual preference and utility. Instead
of leaving private incentives to interact in the open market, however, groups
create an infrastructure for a market-like interaction. Through such infrastructure,
even sticky norms may evolve in a more efficient fashion.

iii. GROUPS AND OTHERS
Groups may serve as market surrogates in their internal dynamic. In
sovereign debt contracting, however, the evolution in contract practices
88
occurred across categories of market participants, collected in distinct groups.
Legal counsel to sovereign debtors, debtors themselves, both underwriters and
their attorneys, and various types of creditors were all party to the transition
from UACs to CACs. What might groups contribute to norm transformation
across categories of market participants? 'What of the interaction of groups with
those beyond their membership?8 9
In broad terms, groups might be seen to serve a market-mediating function
in their external interactions. Groups essentially stand in for their members as
the mechanisms of external interchange. In sovereign debt contracting, for
example, market participants often acted through the medium of groups, rather
than individually. This is illustrated by the active role of the creditor-comprised
Gang of Seven, as well as its constituent groups, including the 11F and EMCA.
Likewise, the G-7 was the public face of developed countries in the SDRM
debate, rather than its constituent members.

88

Suggesting the distinct internal and external faces of groups, Fred Bergsten has called on the G-20

89

to make the move from "discussion forum" to "action committee." See Bergsten, The G-20 and the
World Economy (cited in note 18). The cotton industry trade associations studied by Lisa
Bernstein---essentially, groups made up of groups-are likewise suggestive of the dual internal
and external functions of groups. See Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 1726 (cited in note 6).
One might assume that the interaction of groups with outsiders, including other groups, would
parallel the interaction of market participants within groups. Arguably, in fact, much of the
distinction between the two forms of interaction is definitional. How we define the relevant unit
of analysis may thus be all that distinguishes one form of interaction from the other. To this
effect, one might wonder whether the Gang of Seven-comprised of seven independent creditor
groups-was a group or some sort of collection of groups? Yet an identity of internal and
external group dynamics seems unlikely. To begin with, there is reason to doubt that the external
behavior of group tracks the external behavior of individuals. That two heads are better than one
may tell us little about whether two groups are better than one. Additionally, at least some of the
aforementioned characteristics of interaction within groups are likely to manifest themselves
differently in groups' external interactions.
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Combining the internal and external roles of groups in norm
transformation that I propose, groups may often face a simultaneous need to
coordinate the norms of their members, and to advance those norms externally,
through a careful mix of coordination and competition. in the latter role, groups
aim to advocate their internal norms externally, and perhaps especially to
undecided groups of market participants. In the sovereign debt markets, for
example, various groups directly and indirectly advocated their positions to the
critical, but noncommittal, group of emerging market issuers.
Within this internal-external paradigm of groups in norm transformation,
one might identify three external-facing functions of groups. First, groups
facilitate effective negotiation across categories of market participants. Second,
they help to equalize power across such categories. Finally, groups may act to
internalize network externalities, and thereby enhance the prospect of efficient
outcomes. I take up each of these in turn.
To begin, groups can facilitate negotiation in various ways-including (1)
by reducing the number of necessary parties to any negotiation, (2) by
categorizing market participants by type, (3) by facilitating collective action, and
(4) by effectively binding group members to their commitments. We have
already observed the transaction cost-reducing role of groups in facilitating
internal negotiation. Interaction of groups with others, including other groups,
serves a parallel negotiation function. In their external dynamic, however, groups
do not facilitate norm change through the creation of any place for negotiation
(whether physical or metaphysical). Rather, external interaction of group
representatives simply reduces the number of parties to negotiation. As a result,
groups permit direct, versus market-mediated, interaction. Market participants
can, quite literally, now communicate.
External interactions of groups may thus reduce transaction costs, by
enhancing decision speed, and thereby permitting more rapid response to
unexpected change. When the IMF's SDRM proposal was tabled, it could not
but spark a response. Even among those preferring the status quo, some
counterproposal appeared necessary. Such a response, however, might not have
been able to await bilateral engagements of a wide universe of relevant market
participants. The flurry of committee and group interactions in the sovereign
debt markets--especially as things came to a head in late 2002 and early 2003might thus be seen as an attempt to short cut around potentially slower, marketmediated responses to the SDRM. 9 The role of groups may therefore be
especially significant amidst transition, where demand for expedition is high.
90

See Felix Salmon, Blajng a TrailDown Mexico Way, 34 Euromoney 124 (Apr 2003); see also Emad
Mekay, Private Creditors Turn Up Heat on IMF Debt Plan, Inter-Press Service 1 (Dec 18, 2002)
(discussing the downfall of SDRM); Felix Salmon, Calm after the Storm, 34 Euromoney 100, 102
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Beyond reducing the number of parties to an effective negotiation of norm
change across categories of market participants, a second way in which groups
facilitate external negotiation is through their categorization function. The latter
is illustrated by the grouping of sovereign debt market participants into various
categories of creditors, as in the large, buy-side firms of EMCA; categories of
sovereigns, as in the G-7 and G-10; and other categories as well. While any
grouping pattern would reduce the number of negotiating parties, groups'
categorization of market participants by type-and perhaps other less visible
traits-may serve an important signaling function for negotiating counterparts,
regarding the character of particular market participants. 9' One might expect this
function to be especially important for smaller scale market participants, who are
less able to offer direct signals to potential counterparties.
Groups may also play a role in negotiations across categories of market
participants, given their collective action benefits. 92 In some cases, negotiation
across categories-for example, between debtors and creditors-may be
necessary, but there may be inadequate incentives for individual entities in one
or both categories to participate. Group action may help to get everyone to the
table. Stating the point differently, groups may be more willing to invest in an
efficient degree of coordination than individuals.
Finally, groups may also facilitate negotiated norm change across categories
of market participants through intertwined binding and bonding functions.
Given the coercive power of groups over their members-an expressive power,
if nothing else-they can help to hold individual members to their policy
commitments. Groups thus lend individual assurances a tenor of "credible
commitment."9 3 By doing so, groups may enhance confidence across categories
94
of market participants, and thereby facilitate negotiation and agreement.
Beyond the four contributions of groups to effective negotiation across
categories of market participants, as outlined above, groups' external functions

91

92

93

94

(May 2003) (same). The longstanding use of representative creditor committees in the sovereign
debt markets might be noted as a prime example of the capacity of groups to reduce the necessary
parties to negotiation. See Hagan, Designing a LegalFramework at 59-62 (cited in note 58).
See Eric A. Posner, Law and SodalNorms 18-19 (Harvard 2000) (describing function of behavioral
signaling). One might appreciate this function with an eye to the desire of market participants to
join certain groups, and the constraints on their membership. Russia has thus been incorporated
into some aspects of the work of the G-7, but not others. See note 18.
See note 52 and accompanying text.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am Econ
Rev 519 (1983).
Such group constraint is a product, at least in part, of the aforementioned hierarchy of groups.
See note 67 and accompanying text. Such hierarchy may also serve other functions in group
interactions across categories of market participants. In particular, it may help to signal other
market participants as to who can authoritatively speak for actors in a particular category.
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may also include a role in power equalization. Particularly where groups are
constituted along relatively homogenous lines-as exemplified by EMCA (large
buy-side firms), INSOL International (accountants and lawyers), and the BMA
(bond underwriters)-but perhaps even where other categorizations are used
(for example, potential members' geographic origins), groups may help to
equalize power among market participants. Acting in concert, even relatively
weak market participants may be empowered to participate in norm
transformation. In the aggregate, they may be able to hold their own.
Such power equalization becomes important when we analyze the
particular coordination dynamic likely to arise across, rather than within, groups.
Most simply, unlike within groups, the external interactions of groups do not
create any structure of coordination or any sort of collective whole.95 Thus,
absent the rare combination of groups into "metagroups" of a sort, each retains
its prior identity.96 Rather than a structure of coordination, the external
interactions of groups are therefore best understood as ad hoc attempts to
facilitate market-like patterns of engagement. Such engagement is simply more
guided than a true market.
Equally important, the external interactions of groups, and perhaps
particularly their engagement with other groups, are likely to be more
competitive than interactions within groups. I suggest above the prospect of
competition among group members, alongside their pursuit of coordination.
Sovereign debtors' attorneys regularly review each others' documents, and meet
each other both informally and formally; yet they are also competing for
business. 9 So long as coordination remains the dominant preference, however, a
coordination dynamic will persist, with competition simply incorporated into the
mix.
In game theory terms, this pattern is captured by the paradigmatic Battle of
the Sexes, in which the husband and wife introduced above now hope to make
plans for an evening together, but have distinct preferences on where to spend
it-preferences I invert from the anachronistic original:

95
96

97

Given this lack of structure, the cartel concerns outlined above become less apposite. See note 83.
Of course, such "combinations" occasionally occur, as in the case of the Gang of Seven. See note
33.
See Choi and Gulati, What Drives Changes at 23 (cited in note 38); see also notes 55-60 and
accompanying text. Notably, this competitive dynamic would appear to be more about individual
lawyers-and the committees of which they are a part-than the firms of which they are
members.
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As suggested above, communication may no longer suffice to "solve" a
Battle of the Sexes game, given the suddenly strategic character of any relevant
pronouncement. 98 Rather, each party must attempt to develop their own, surely
educated, guesses regarding the likely behavior of their spouse.
With the increased heterogeneity of players across categories of market
participants-think of creditors versus debtors-the balance of coordination
and competition can be expected to shift yet further toward competition. Thus,
the gains from coordination, while still determinative, may be more
counterbalanced by the losses to the party whose preferred standard is ultimately
rejected. Besides greater heterogeneity, the greater aggregate power of groups, as
compared with the individual players' within them, may also increase
competition. Such power may significantly influence group players' strategic
choices-including their willingness to insist on adoption of their preferred
norms.
The conflicts among groups in the creation of model CACs readily
illustrate this more competitive picture. By late 2002, the relatively hard-line
creditors of EMCA were working aggressively to coordinate some emerging
market issuer adoption of its own creditor-friendly model CACs. Faced with the
prospect of a first move to EMCA's harsh terms, issuer-friendly groups abruptly
stepped to the plate. To everyone's surprise, Mexico suddenly announced its
adoption of a milder set of CACs in February 2003. As an attempt to forestall a
shift to EMCA's terms, Mexico's decision-and even timing-make perfect
sense.

99

Extrapolating further from this episode, one might see the interactions of
sovereign debt creditors as exhibiting just the internal-external dynamic offered
above, in which groups seek to build and maintain internal cohesion, while also

98

Each spouse can thus be expected to insist on their unwillingness to go anywhere besides their
preferred destination, regardless of the true strength of their conviction.

99

See Setser, PoliticalEconomyat 21 (cited in note 26).
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influencing outsiders, including neutral groups such as issuers. Over a period of
several years, but particularly after the SDRM proposal, creditors sought to
coordinate around a common position on reform, and particularly on the use of
CACs. In these "internal" efforts to coordinate, an array of potential positions
were offered by various creditor groups, from the shrill and confrontational
EMCA to the milder IIF. These groups aimed to achieve coordination among
themselves, but preferred distinct coordination equilibria, creating a space for
internal advocacy and competition. Ultimately, these internal interactions, under
the metagroup umbrella of the Gang of Seven, produced a consensus to accept a
shift to CACs, but only CACs with exceptional strong creditor protections-the
hard-line position pushed by EMCA. When it came time for the second phase of
external advocacy, however, this internal dynamic failed to serve creditors'
interests. In the external competition, the creditors' model clauses were roundly
rejected by issuers, attorneys, and developed countries. The internal competition
among creditors, thus, ultimately rendered them unable to compete in the
external competition across categories of market participants. The latter proved
more difficult to navigate.
To capture the more competitive interaction across groups, and in the
interaction of groups with outsiders generally, one might move beyond the
Battle of the Sexes, to the familiar game of Chicken. In the latter, a coordination
dynamic persists, but it is a highly antagonistic one. Two cars thus race toward a
cliff, with the loser (or "chicken") being the first to swerve to avoid a plunge.
This strategic dynamic can be captured as follows:
"Buzz"

Maintain

Turn Off

Speed

Maintain
James Dean

-10,-10

5,-2

-2,5

0,0

Speed

Turn Off

just this dynamic is evident in the external interactions of groups in
sovereign debt contracting. In the latter example, competing standards favored
by opposed groups-most obviously the sovereign debtor members of the G20, and the creditors of the IIF, EMCA, and related groups, but also the
network of sovereign debt market lawyers and the developed countries of the G10-faced off. Each group sought to "bluff" its counterpart into an expectation
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that it would reject any compromise, and thereby bring that counterparty to
accept its preferred standard.'0 0 The first to blink-in the present case, the
opponents of flexible CACs-found themselves stuck with the competing
standard.'
If this pattern captures the dynamic at work in groups' interactions with
nonmembers, including other groups, the importance of groups in enabling
weaker market participants to hold their own is self-evident. In essence, by
joining together, some market actors may emerge better able to "win" the game
of Chicken. At a minimum, in groups, such market participants may be able
to
02
game.'
the
play
least)
(at
will
they
that
expectations
players'
other
influence
Finally, beyond their easing of negotiation and their equalization of power
across categories of market participants, a final externally oriented mechanism of
group facilitation of norm change is their capacity to internalize the network
externalities arising from such transition. Much of the resistance to norm change
in sovereign debt contracting, as in other milieu characterized by network
effects, arises from the inadequate compensation of first movers for the positive
externalities produced by their shift to a superior norm. If the owner of a
network, or other dominant market participant, could harness these gains and
use them to subsidize transition, such resistance could be overcome.' °3
Large collectives such as the IIF or EMTA stand to gain-across their
membership---substantial benefits from the shift to more efficient contracting
norms. They might therefore help to facilitate shifts away from a dominant, but
inefficient, norm. This holds true in the internal coordination of groups as well,
but it is likely to be especially acute in the negotiation of norm change across
categories of market participants, for at least two reasons: First, divergent
preferences are more likely across categories of market participants; second, any
shift is more likely to favor the preferred norms of one category of market
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On the various game dynamics explored above, see generally Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 233-45
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(cited in note 17).
Perhaps suggesting a Chicken game dynamic, Choi and Gulati observe a potentially interesting

102

trend among underwriter counsel and debtor counsel in sovereign bond issuances. Contrary to
any expectation of zealous-and conflicting-representation, the debtor's attorney would seem to
dominate over nominally independent underwriter counsel. See Choi and Gulati, What Drives
Changes at 26 (cited in note 38). Perhaps to similar effect, Sean Hagan has highlighted the
divergence in buy-side and sell-side attitudes towards the IMF's SDRM proposal. See Hagan,
Designing a LegalFramework at 77 (cited in note 58).
Of course, across cases, the question of who is willing to take the aggressive, or dominant,

103

position in the Chicken game is not random. Rather, as suggested above, some players are
consistently more likely to play a dominant role, shaping the expectations of other players as the
most likely ultimate outcome. See note 58.
See Ahdieh, 76 S Cal L Rev at 333-34 (cited in note 12).
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participant over the 4other. In such situations, groups may help to ease-to
finance-transition.' 0
The external interactions of groups, particularly with other groups, may
have significant implications for efficient norm transformation. Such
interactions, as evident in the transition from UACs to CACs, may play an
integral role in encouraging a shift toward preferred norms. Yet this is likely to
be a less predictable-and far more contentious--dynamic than the twin
patterns of coordination and learning that were suggested to characterize the
interactions within groups.
IV. GROUP FAILURE AND NORM CHANGE
A final dimension of the impact of groups on the evolution of norms arises
not from the affirmative action of groups, but from their failure. Even by
comparison with the analysis of groups above, this last category of group
influence has been especially neglected. With few exceptions, norm change is
commonly analyzed as the adoption of new norms.'05 In game theoretic terms, norm
change has been conceived to arise from affirmative coordination around a new
standard. Yet where a norm is already in place, the process of norm transition is,
in equal measure, a shift awayfrom an existing norm.
This neglect is readily illustrated with reference to the recent shift in
sovereign debt contracting norms. While most analysis has spoken of a shift to
CACs, the transition was equally a shift away from UACs.10 6 How might we
construct this alternative story in sovereign debt contracting? As described
above, Mexico announced its intention to issue $1 billion in bonds with CACs in
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See id. It bears noting, of course, that external interactions among groups, like interaction within
groups, has its costs. Most important is an increase in agency costs. See Michael C. Jensen and
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior,Agenty Costs and Ownership Strcture, 3 J
Fin Econ 305, 308 (1976) (offering theory of agency costs in principal-agent relationships); see
also Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agengy Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L Rev 621, 636-37 (2004).
But see Bainbridge, 55 Vand L Rev at 37-38 (cited in note 9) (suggesting ways in which agency
costs may be minimized with groups). While agency costs arise even within groups, it is not until
we focus on externally directed group action that such costs fully reveal themselves. By using
groups as proxies for their members in coordination across categories of market participants, one
can predict some necessary disconnect and resulting efficiency losses. In sovereign debt
contracting, this pattern might be suggested by the fracturing of certain groups over CACs, as
outlined in the following section. Besides heightened agency costs, interaction across groups may
also increase the degree of group polarization within each group. This is especially likely if each
perceives itself as an "outgroup" vis-A-vis the other. See Sunstein, 110 Yale L J at 98 (cited in note

9).
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See, for example, McAdams, 96 Mich L Rev at 338 (cited in note 13); Cass R. Sunstein, How Law
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Constructs Preferences, 86 Georgetown L J 2637 (1998).
See, for example, Salmon, 34 Euromoney at 124 (cited in note 90).
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early February 2003.107 At that moment, an alternative future might have played
out. Most significantly, creditors might have effectively coordinated their
resistance to any change, by demanding a heightened risk premium from Mexico
for its CAC bonds. Consequently, other sovereign debtors might have dismissed
Mexico's overture, electing to maintain the UAC norm. In turn, Mexico might
likely have backtracked on its use of CACs, ending the abortive "emergence" of
CACs. Given a preference of creditors for UACs, or minimally for more
restructuring-resistant CACs (including an 85 percent threshold for
amendment), this scenario could not have been foreclosed in February 2003.
That it did not come to pass-that the shift from UACs to CACs was
ultimately successful-may have turned, at least in part, on the inability of
creditor groups to hold together. Notwithstanding creditor distress with
Mexico's decision, creditor groups proved unable to maintain a coordinated
position in the aftermath of Mexico's announcement. The 11F thus appeared to
be somewhat resigned to the shift. By contrast, EMCA expressed far more
distress with the prospect of Mexican-style CACs. Yet EMCA could not
effectively coordinate its membership around a policy of resistance. Most
importantly, Mohamed El-Erian-an influential emerging market portfolio
manager, given the massive volume of debt under his management, and a
founding member of EMCA-broke with the group, to buy Mexico's CAC
debt. °8 With that decision, the prospect of effective resistance came to seem
futile. Confirming as much, by early 2004, the once-prominent EMCA had all
but disappeared as a player in the sovereign debt markets.
The connection between group failure and norm change is also suggested
by the rise and fall of the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders
("GCAB"). In the aftermath of Argentina's offering of relatively stingy
restructuring terms for its significant mass of defaulted debt in September 2003,
the GCAB emerged to coordinate the diffuse network of Argentina's foreign
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See note 35 and accompanying text.
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EMTA's public condemnation of Mexico's use of a 75 percent threshold, see Alinna Arora and
Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Retbinking the Sovereign Debt RestructuringApproach, 9 Nafta L & Bus Rev
Am 629 (2003), but inability to force any collective response from the Gang of Seven, see Elmar
B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses-The Way Forward (forthcoming Georgetown J Intl L, 2005),
represented a similar group failure in the ultimate transition to CACs. The place of group failure
in the transition to CACs arguably manifested itself even earlier, however, when the entire Gang
of Seven's newfound receptivity to some use of CACs was seemingly triggered by the 11F's shift
from strong opposition to grudging support. See Richard Portes, Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises:
The New Old Framework, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper, No 4717)
(2004), available online at <htrp://faculty.london.edu/rportes/DP4717.pdf > (visited Mar 29,
2005).
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creditors. °9 Together with a network of domestic creditors, GCAB issued
aggressive demands for a more favorable settlement, even putting forward its
own (similarly extreme) counteroffer.
Ultimately, however, the group could not sustain the coordination it
initially achieved. A handful, and then a growing number, of institutional
creditors began to buy up retail Argentine creditors who were unwilling to hold
out for better restructuring terms. Notwithstanding GCAB's assertions of
unalterable resistance to Argentina's offer, individual creditors and creditor
collectives began to tender their debt in Argentina's proposed exchange, with
major moves coming in the very final hours before the 'exchange closed. With
that, almost as quickly as it had emerged as a significant player, GCAB
disappeared. u
With the resulting success of Argentina's offering, the norms of debt
restructuring were arguably transformed. Argentina's exchange appeared to
prove that active negotiation with creditors, let alone accommodation of them,
was not a prerequisite to effective restructuring. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, sovereign debtor hardball might-at least on occasion-represent an
effective strategy. Had the GCAB and its peer groups held together more
successfully, however, future debtors might have been far more willing to
negotiate.
That such group failure might be important in norm transformation, and
particularly in the displacement of status quo norms, makes perfect sense,
notwithstanding the lack of attention it has been given. In coordination games,
as well as the network-driven economies I have previously analogized to the
latter,"' efficient transition is stymied by the lock-in of existing norms or
standards. With such lock-in, even inefficient norms become difficult to
displace. Yet this is a story of groups.
A prevailing norm is thus locked in by its group of users. The stability of
that group therefore goes to the heart of any pattern of lock-in. If the group
begins to weaken, and loses its capacity to coordinate, the opportunity emerges
for alternative norms to dislodge the existing norm: From this perspective, then,
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Analogously, EMCA emerged in response to Ecuador's proposed use of now infamous "exit
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consents" for its 2000 restructuring.
On the GCAB's role in Argentina's restructuring, including its disappearance from the scene, see
Anna Gelpern, What Markets Can Learnfrom Agentina, 24 Ind Fin L Rev 1 (Apr 2005). Suggesting
the implosion of both EMCA and GCAB, compare the website of the EMTA available online at
<http://www.emta.org> (updated website of EMTA), with the websites of EMCA and GCAB,
making no reference to completion of Argentina's exchange, available online at
<http://www.emcreditors.org> and <http://www.gcab.org> (websites of EMCA and GCAB,
making no reference to completion of Argentina's exchange).
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See generally Ahdieh, 77 S Cal L Rev at 233-38 (cited in note 17).
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one might predict norm change not only when groups coordinate internally
around a new norm, or when they coordinate amongst one another, but also
when they struggle in their efforts to coordinate. In norm change, group failure
may sometimes be essential to success.
CONCLUSION
Groups matter. They contribute in vital ways to the coordination of
efficient norm transformation. In appropriate circumstances, collections of
market participants can produce dynamic patterns of internal change, turning
groups into something more than the sum of their parts. Groups can also impact
norm change through their interactions with one another, and with other
outsiders, by facilitating negotiation, equalizing power, and internalizing network
externalities. Finally, groups may even contribute to norm change through their
failure. The internal workings and the external impact of groups therefore
deserve our attention.
I do not doubt the capacity of various forms of expressive law and
individual norm entrepreneurs to drive norm transformation. The foregoing
simply highlights a "third way" to norm change. Out of the function and
dysfunction of groups, an evolution of norms can be expected to arise.
As coordination becomes an increasingly critical aspect of a globalized
world economy-especially one more and more dependent on integrated
technologies-variously constituted committees, networks, and groups are likely
to play a growing role both domestically and internationally. This is apparent in
the recent transformation of sovereign debt contracting norms, in the ongoing
role of groups in the evolution of those norms, and in the steady emergence of
new committees, networks, and groups in this area. In any credible analysis of
norm change, groups should therefore be carefully considered. They may be
essential players in an effective transition.
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